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Abstract This paper focuses on cyber situational awareness and describes
a Visual Analytics solution for monitoring and putting in tight relation data
from network level with the organization’s business. The goal of the proposed
solution is to make different security profiles (network security officer, network
security manager, and financial security manager) aware of the actual network
state (e.g., risk and attack progress) and the impact it actually has on the
business tasks, making clear the relationships that exist between the network
level and the business level. The proposed solution is instantiated on the ACEA
infrastructure, the Italian company that provides power and water purification
services to cities in central Italy (millions of end users).
Keywords Cyber situational awareness · Business processes
1 Introduction
Situational awareness plays a central role in the analysis of risks of critical
infrastructures and refers to two (at least) complementary aspects: the under-
standing of the network status and the consequences that the actual network
situation has on the organization’s mission. To improve situational awareness,
it is needed to deal with issues arising from the cardinality of the network
nodes, their spread on the geographical level, the presence of different hi-
erarchical layers that exist at both topological and geographical levels, the
need of combining quick awareness technical and financial overviews together
with local (geographical and topological ) details. An additional challenge
arises from the integration of local layer 3 topological information (e.g., local
networks within a building) with geographical spread. Finally, network infor-
mation should be in correlation with the organization’s processes. This paper
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extends the Visual Analytics solution presented in [1] introducing a novel layer
3 topology visualization that allows for dealing with sparse and composite net-
works on a geographical map and linking it to a pure topological view (Section
4).
The novel features of the proposed solution are: a) the seamlessly integra-
tion of the geographical and topological hierarchical layers, b) the represen-
tation of the cyber risk at different scales, c) the integration of the network
topology and geography with the organization’s business processes, d) a novel
visualization able to quickly raise the user attention on the relevant frag-
ment(s) of the network, e) local and geographical display of layer 3 topology
data, and f) a visual environment for high-level management. The paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work, Section 3 describes
the system overview, Section 4 describes the novel visualization of compos-
ite nodes, Section 5 describes the manager interface, while Section 6 presents
conclusions and future activities.
2 Related Work
The work in [5] allows for inspecting geographical and time dependent logs,
while [9] relies on a geographic representation of the resources, using the
GeoViz tooolkit [12]; conversely, we use composite nodes and resources are
first aggregated and mapped or directly mapped, according to their cardinal-
ity and space constraints. In [11] is proposed the integration of geographical
and logical representations. Our solution provides an aggregate representation
of these different properties, single and composite layer 3 handling, augmented
with mission impact information. [13] presents a system that integrates geo-
graphical, temporal, and logical views, while [10] presents a system that co-
ordinates geographical visualizations with other security data: however, the
mapping and aggregation are just computed in other views and then mapped
statically on the current visualization, without the tight coupling and inter-
activity that are present in our solution. [14] presents a solution for merging
geographical and logical topology, in which the geographical information is
not tied to the network topology. Similarly to our work, this proposal allows
for inspecting networks by clustering nodes; however, our solution preserves
the geographical information of the hidden network using Voronoi diagrams.
ViSAw [15] presents a visualization environment for assessing the impact of
detrimental events on the organization’s business: however, the proposed so-
lutions are more tied at an analytical evaluation (scatter-plot, tabular chart)
and less integrated in an organic view like the solution proposed in this paper.
Moreover, the links between network nodes and business’ processes are not
represented. Both [7] and [8] propose various 3-D representations, linking net-
work nodes to organization’s processes. In our solution we use 2-D layering and
focus+context in order to help the user to navigate the visualization, avoiding
typical 3-D manipulation issues. Finally, [6] visualizes the links between orga-
nization’s processes and physical devices; however, it does it in a block-diagram
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Fig. 1 Processes (right), overview (center) and context (bottom). The overview contains
three network fragments (in blue) associated with the Central Distribution (100% functional)
and two fragments (in violet) associated with the North Energy Distribution (partially
compromised), showing a sub-process impacted by compromised devices (red nodes).
fashion, without the integration with other layers (e.g.,the geographical layer)
that our solution envision.
3 System Overview
The proposed approach uses two layers, one regarding the representation of
the network nodes, allowing the user to quickly identify compromised nodes;
the other one, instead, merging compromised nodes with their impact on the
organization. Combining these two layers it is possible to identify the most
problematic nodes. Details on such layers are available on [1].
The Network Layer deals with low level cyber incidents. To avoid infor-
mation cluttering and to allow the user to inspect particular areas of interest
our solution considers both geographical hierarchy and logical hierarchy, based
on the semantic of any single resource, allowing for inspecting resources both in
an aggregated and punctual fashion. The geographical hierarchy is tightened
with the logical hierarchy of the ACEA: primary cabins , secondary cabins,
and smart meters. Devices are either mapped on the geography or clustered;
colors convey different levels of risk [1].
The Mission Impact Layer deals with network and processes, showing
the relationship between compromised nodes and business processes. For each
process a list of supporting devices is defined, providing a connection between
the network and the business processes (see Figure 1). To visually convey the
impact of a compromised device on its supported process, the visualization uses
the concept of area corruption. Each compromised device will produce a hole
in the area representing the supported sub-process, hole that is proportional
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to the value of its operational impact score. The extension of corrupted areas
will be an immediate clue for the user about which device is most responsible
for the loss of operational level.
4 Integrating local and geographical layer 3 topologies
This section introduces the novel layer 3 topology added to the system, dealing
with the issue that in a pure geographic visualization each single point has a
specific meaning, and representing more elements in the same point (e.g., lo-
cal networks within a building) integrating them with the overall geographical
view is not a trivial task. To solve the problem it is needed to distinguish at
geographical level single nodes and subnetworks, allowing for semantic zoom-
ing in local topologies, according to the specific nature of multi-scale networks
(see, e.g., [2]) preserving the integration with the geographical layer. The se-
lected encoding has been a glyph [3], in order to capture different aspects of
the inner subnetwork. In particular, a composite node is represented either
with a glyph portraying connection information, or with a glyph summarizing
some relevant subnetwork characteristics, e.g., the node risk level distribution,
see Figure 2.
Fig. 2 Two examples of glyphs used for a) distinguishing single node by complex nodes
with inner topology and b) conveying aggregate information of local complex topologies.
The one on the left allows for making explicit the IP interfaces of the whole sub network,
while the one on the left is representing the distribution of risk of the subnetwork nodes.
In order to get details on the inner subnetwork, a semantic zoom interac-
tion has been designed. Clicking on a composite node will expand the node’s
internal structure using an adjacency matrix, composed of a grid, located in
the middle, and of four bars, each one located on a side of the grid, see Fig-
ure 3. Each bar represents all the nodes of the subnetwork, and black dots in
the matrix indicate that the two corresponding nodes are connected at layer
3. The redundancy of information allows for a better representation of layer
3 links when a composite node is required to be connected to the rest of the
network: the geographical area is split to avoid visual occlusion, and logical
links are drawn selecting the best connection side, minimizing crossings and
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Fig. 3 Semantic zoom on a composite node. The adjacency matrix allows for representing
in a compact way the layer 3 topology of the subnetwork: a black dot in position i, j indicates
that node i and node j are connected at level 3. Color coding represents node risk levels.
Fig. 4 Semantic zooming in a composite node, showing details of the internal layer 3
topology connections, using a redundant adjacency matrix, and preserving the overall ge-
ographical view. Redundancy allows for optimizing the drawing of the connections of the
composite node with the rest of the graph. Color coding on matrix row and columns provide
the same information of the nodes’ risk distribution shown in Figure 2 and facilitate the
understanding of the redundant representation.
occlusion, see Figure 5. This technique is a novel one and correspond to the
actual state of the art [4].
To further investigate the topology of a composite node, it is possible to
activate a coordinated view that shows details on the subnet, like detailed
division in subnetworks and node types (e.g., firewall, router, etc.), and the
roles they have with respect to attack paths: source node, intermediate node,
and target node. Hovering on a composite node for more than 2 seconds trig-
gers the pop-up view shown on Figure 5; further interacting with such new
view allows for making explicit the list of nodes reachable by a specific source
node, showing all reachable nodes and highlighting the reachable target nodes,
activity that is particularly useful when inspecting attack paths, see Figure 5.
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Fig. 5 A parallel view showing the logical subnetwork structure, the different devices, and
all the nodes reachable by the blue source node. Red nodes represent the critical target
nodes.
5 High Level Management
As stated in the introduction, the manager needs to obtain aggregated infor-
mation about the overall cyber-security state of his organization in order to
quickly and clearly make decisions that depend on both risk levels and costs.
Data are collected from the network and mission impact layers and summa-
rized using 3 main indicators: 1) the Aggregated Risk Level that summarizes
the risk level of the network showing the proportion of nodes whose risk is
above a threshold, 2) the Aggregated Mission Impact Level that defines the
overall impact the compromised nodes have on the operational level of the sup-
ported business process, and 3) the Response Financial Level that provides the
financial security manager with information regarding the cost that the exe-
cution of corrective actions, structured in what is defined as a response plan,
can have in relation with the expected raise in business processes operational
level. In order to make easy for the financial security manager to interpret the
data, the visualization uses basic pie charts and line charts as starting point
for further interaction, presenting a clear overview of the system status but
still allowing to drill down to details.
The user can expand each risk and impact pie charts into detailed views
based on the business processes of the organisation (see Figure 6) allowing
the financial security manager to inspect single business process, plotting their
temporal behavior using line-charts. In the same way, expanding the Response
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Fig. 6 High Level Management environment in its expanded mode. The financial security
manager can inspect finer details regarding each of the indicators and trends and an algo-
rithm for geometric pattern recognition allows to select an arbitrary part of the trend, by
selecting the initial and final points, and obtain from the system the most similar part of
the trend with respect to the selected part. This can help to identify precise trend of service
or disservice and see how many times they occurred.
financial level chart allows for inspecting the sequence of response plans pre-
viously applied (based on previously happened attack scenarios). The lower
part presents a tachometer like view, showing the overall system performances.
Expanding it reveals its temporal trend and a separate context chart allows
to zoom on particular interesting areas in order to refine the analysis.
6 Conclusions and future work
The paper presented a system targeted to increase cyber situational aware-
ness for different cyber security profiles. The proposed technique deals with
the different hierarchical layers that exists at both topological and geograph-
ical levels, smoothly integrating composite nodes with simple nodes, allowing
for the seamless exploration of the layer 3 connectivity of geographically dis-
tributed nodes and subnetworks. Such pieces of information are aggregated for
high level decision making. Information about network nodes is associated with
resulting business impact using a novel visualization based on areas corruption
making clear which part of the network is the source of mission degradation
and to which extent. This solution has been instantiated and tested on the
ACEA power distribution system.
While the actual implementation is tailored towards the risk analysis, the
detection of actually compromised nodes, and layer 3 exploration, we are cur-
rently extending the environment to deal with: a) the relationship with attack
paths and vulnerabilities, developing additional layers of analysis, b) the im-
pact that mitigation actions produce on the system, both at risk level and at
organization’s mission level, and c) the definition of a formal model able to
translate high level financial strategies into concrete actions on the network
configuration.
8 Marco Angelini, Giuseppe Santucci
Acknowledgments This work was supported by the PANOPTESEC Eu-
ropean Project (FP7-ICT-2013-10 Objective ICT-2013.1.5 Trustworthy ICT
item).
References
1. M. Angelini and G. Santucci. Visual cyber situational awareness for critical infrastruc-
tures. In Proceedings of ACM VINCI ’15, August 24-26, 2015, Tokyo, Japan.
2. D. Auber, Y. Chiricota, F. Jourdan, and G. Melanc¸on. Multiscale visualization of small
world networks. In Proceedings of the Ninth Annual IEEE Conference on Information
Visualization, INFOVIS’03, pages 75–81, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer
Society.
3. R. Borgo, J. Kehrer, D. H. Chung, E. Maguire, R. S. Laramee, H. Hauser, M. Ward,
and M. Chen. Glyph-based visualization: Foundations, design guidelines, techniques
and applications. Eurographics State of the Art Reports, pages 39–63, May 2013.
http://diglib.eg.org/EG/DL/conf/EG2013/stars/039-063.pdf.
4. J. Buchmller, D. Jckle, F. Stoffel, and D. A. Keim. SpaceCuts: Making Room for
Visualizations on Maps. In E. Bertini, N. Elmqvist, and T. Wischgoll, editors, EuroVis
2016 - Short Papers. The Eurographics Association, 2016.
5. V. Y. Chen, S. Ko, D. S. Ebert, C. Z. Qian, and A. M. Razip. Semanticprism: A
multi-aspect view of large high-dimensional data: Vast 2012 mini challenge 1 award:
Outstanding integrated analysis and visualization. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE
Conference on Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST), VAST ’12, pages
259–260, Washington, DC, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
6. S. Creese, M. Goldsmith, N. Moffat, J. Happa, and I. Agrafiotis. Cybervis: visual-
izing the potential impact of cyber attacks on the wider enterprise. In Technologies
for Homeland Security (HST), 2013 IEEE International Conference on, pages 73–79.
IEEE, 2013.
7. A. D’Amico and M. Larkin. Methods of visualizing temporal patterns in and mission
impact of computer security breaches. In DARPA Information Survivability Conference
&amp; Exposition II, 2001. DISCEX’01. Proceedings, volume 1, pages 343–351. IEEE,
2001.
8. A. D’Amico and S. Salas. Visualization as an aid for assessing the mission impact of
information security breaches’. In DARPA Information Survivability Conference and
Exposition, 2003. Proceedings, volume 2, pages 190–195. IEEE, 2003.
9. N. Giacobe and S. Xu. Geovisual analytics for cyber security: Adopting the geoviz
toolkit. In Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST), 2011 IEEE Conference
on, pages 315–316, Oct 2011.
10. J. R. Goodall and M. Sowul. Viassist: Visual analytics for cyber defense. In Technologies
for Homeland Security, 2009. HST’09. IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2009.
11. M. Gre´goire and L. Beaudoin. Visualisation for network situational awareness in com-
puter network defence. Visualisation and the Common Operational Picture, 2005.
12. F. Hardisty and A. C. Robinson. The geoviz toolkit: using component-oriented coor-
dination methods for geographic visualization and analysis. International Journal of
Geographical Information Science, 25(2):191–210, 2011.
13. Y. Hideshima and H. Koike. Starmine: A visualization system for cyber attacks. In
Proceedings of the 2006 Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information Visualisation - Vol-
ume 60, APVis ’06, pages 131–138, Darlinghurst, Australia, Australia, 2006. Australian
Computer Society, Inc.
14. E. Karapistoli, P. Sarigiannidis, and A. A. Economides. Srnet: a real-time, cross-based
anomaly detection and visualization system for wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings
of the Tenth Workshop on Visualization for Cyber Security, pages 49–56. ACM, 2013.
15. M. Nusinov, S. J. Yang, J. Holsopple, and M. Sudit. Visaw: Visualizing threat and
impact assessment for enhanced situation awareness. In Military Communications Con-
ference, 2009. MILCOM 2009. IEEE, pages 1–7. IEEE, 2009.
